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Recent Decisions
state's interest in life and the interest of the hospital and its staff out-
weigh the religiously motivated refusal of the patient to accept a blood
transfusion. Constitutional rights do not exist in a vacuum-clashes
between separate constitutional principles are unavoidable. However,
the balance struck by the Heston court reflects a humane step that the
courts have seemed intuitively led to take.
W. Robert Ament
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-REGULATORY INSPEC-
TIONS-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a war-
rantless search and seizure, if authorized by a valid inspection statute
limited in scope, time, and place, does not violate fourth amendment
principles.
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
Biswell, a pawnshop owner, was convicted in federal district court for
violating firearms laws. His contention, throughout his trial and appeal,
was that the Gun Control Act of 1968,1 as it applied to him, was uncon-
stitutional. He based his argument on two beliefs. First, the apparent
authorization to search, as contained in the Act,2 was invalid without a
warrant. Second, since such authorization was invalid, any subsequent
acquiescence in a search could not be deemed voluntary. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sustained both of Biswell's contentions.3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari4 to consider the allegations of
the U.S. Attorney's office that the authorization to search was valid. In
the alternative, the government argued that Biswell consented to a
search of his storeroom.
Accepting the government's argument, thereby reversing the court
of appeals, the Supreme Court held that consent is not an issue where
1. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1970) provides, in part:
The Secretary may enter during business hours the premises (including places of
storage) of any firearms . . . dealer . . . for the purpose of inspecting or examining
(1) any records or documents required to be kept by such . . . dealer . . . under
the provisions of this chapter, and (2) any firearms . . . kept or stored by such . . .
dealer . . . at such premises.
2. Id.
3. United States v. Biswell, 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971). The opinion of the court
was written by Clark, J., Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, retired, sitting by
designation.
4. 404 U.S. 983 (1971).
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the legality of a search is based on authority of a valid statute, i.e., one
that is carefully limited in scope, time, and place.5 Justice Douglas dis-
sented from the opinion of the Court, challenging the majority's inter-
pretation of the precedent cases it used to support its conclusions.6
When a federal treasury agent visited Biswell at his pawnshop, he
routinely allowed an examination of his books. When, however, he was
asked by the agent to open a locked storeroom, Biswell immediately
requested to see a warrant. The agent, when asked if he had such a
warrant in his possession, replied "no" but advised Biswell that the
Gun Control Act authorized such a request and subsequent search. A
copy of the statute was produced for examination. Biswell then allowed
the search, stating, "[i]f that is the law, I guess it is all right."7 The
agent found two sawed off rifles that undisputedly fell within the pur-
view of the Gun Control Act and various other federal statutes. These
statutes eventually formed the basis of a criminal complaint.8 Hence,
a warrantless search, accompanied by questionable consent, took place
on Biswell's business property.
The field of regulatory inspections has historically been in a state of
flux. It appeared, in 1959, however, to have culminated in Frank v.
Maryland.9 Frank was convicted and fined pursuant to a Baltimore
health and nuisance statute' 0 after refusing to allow inspection of his
home without a warrant. The Court upheld his conviction. It reasoned
that regulatory inspections "touch at most upon the periphery of...
interests"'1 that must be safeguarded, causing only "the slightest re-
striction on [petitioner's] claims of privacy.' 12
The Frank opinion, like most before it, related exhaustively the his-
tory behind the adaption of the fourth amendment, 3 beginning with
5. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
6. The opinion of the Court uses only three cases to reinforce its rationale. All were
distinguished or held to be inapposite to the case at bar. The reader, of course, may
draw his own conclusion but to this writer, any opinion that distinguishes cases without
correspondingly formulating a holding based on some judicial precedent is substantially
weakened (unless, of course, the case is so unique as to lead a court to the conclusion
that the subject matter has never before been treated).
7. 442 F.2d 1189, 1191 (1971).
8. Biswell was charged with violating various provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 923 (1970)
as well as other licensing and registration statutes. See 406 U.S. at 312-13.
9. 359 U.S. 360, rehearing denied, 360 U.S. 914 (1959).
10. BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 12, §§ 112, 120 (1960).
11. 359 U.S. at 367.
12. Id. Only once prior to 1959 did the federal courts decide otherwise. See District of
Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
13. tSee generally Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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the abhorrence toward the English general warrant that was finally dis-
carded in the landmark case of Entick v. Carrington,14 through the colo-
nial Writs of Assistance, 15 to the founding fathers' drafting of the fourth
amendment.16 The majority in Frank spoke of the individual's right
"to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy, the right to shut
the door on officials of the state unless their entry is under proper au-
thority of law."' 7 Both Frank and Biswell challenged a warrantless reg-
ulatory inspection as violative of the fourth amendment, 8 primarily
because no consent was given to search. Although lip service was paid
to the underlying doctrine of the right to privacy, Frank, in effect, lay
to rest any notion that private interests outweigh the public need for
regulatory inspections conducted in the manner described by the
Court.19
In a short time, the dissenting justices in Frank saw their position
accepted. Only eight years elapsed between Frank and the landmark
decision of Camara v. Municipal Court20 which held that under most
circumstances 2' a non-consensual, warrantless, regulatory search was un-
reasonable per se. Thus, the Camara Court expressly repudiated much
of the Frank rationale. The Court reasoned, over a strong dissenting
opinion, 22 that there was no overriding public interest to be protected,
at the expense of fourth amendment guarantees, through the exemp-
tion of regulatory inspections from the warrant requirement. Most
regulatory inspections historically have been looked upon by the pub-
lic as necessary and, hence, an overwhelming percentage of the popu-
lace has always consented: To those few who refused, the Court stated
that the warrant, as a tool, could be used, if necessary, to gain forcible
entry.
Although Camara dealt with invasion of the privacy of the home,
the Court, in a companion case, See v. Seattle,23 extended the Camara
14. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
15. 359 U.S. at 364 nn.2 & 3.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
17. 359 U.S. at 365.
18. Although the Frank case as a whole was treated as a fourth amendment case,
there were portions devoted to a due process argument which, because Biswell deals solely
with the former, do not concern us here.
19. 359 U.S. at 361-62.
20. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
21. See part III of the majority opinion in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at
539. All exceptions noted were considered emergency situations and hence immune from
the warrant requirement.
22. 387 U.S. at 546 (dissenting opinion).
23. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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holding to commercial property. Unlike Camara, however, See was not
specific in delimiting the areas where a warrant was not required.
Nevertheless, the common thread of "consent" laced its way through
both decisions.
Consent, although spoken of in Camara and See, was not defined. A
year later, in Bumper v. North Carolina,24 the Court held that the
burden of proving consent cannot be discharged "by showing no more
than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority ... [Such a] situation
is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there
is coercion there cannot be consent." 25 Bumper dealt with a peace offi-
cer's statement to a private citizen that he possessed a warrant to enter
the citizen's home. Since no warrant was produced at trial, the ground-
work was laid for a decision based on the issue of consent. Although
Bumper is factually distinguishable from Biswell, Justice Douglas
noted in his dissenting opinion in Biswell that the holding of Bumper
should apply. 26 He also relied heavily on Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States27 as did the court of appeals in Biswell when it reversed
the conviction. 28
Colonnade seems virtually identical to Biswell, yet the Court man-
aged to distinguish each from the other. The majority in Biswell felt
that the distinguishing feature was the use of force in Colonnade.
Bumper, however, tells us that force can take the form of coercion29
and need not be physical. Although it would have been disturbing if
the Biswell Court considered this issue and then proceeded to reject
the Bumper rationale, it is indeed perplexing that it brushed the argu-
ment aside without comment. Colonnade concerned a warrantless
search of the premises of a liquor dealer-more specifically his refusal
to unlock his storeroom to allow inspection by federal agents. After
repeated efforts to obtain consent, physical force was used to break a
lock and seize improperly bottled liquor.30 The Court held that gain-
24. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
25. Id. at 548-50.
26. 406 U.S. at 319 (dissenting opinion).
27. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
28. 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971).
29. 391 U.S. at 548-50.
30. 397 U.S. at 73. The liquor inspection statute used as colorable authority in Colon-
nade was virtually identical to that before the Court in Biswell. 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1970)
provides:
The Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the premises (including
places of storage) of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any
records or other documents required to be kept by such dealer under this chapter
256
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ing a warrant or commencing prosecution were the only alternatives
open when consent was not forthcoming from a proprietor.3' As noted
above, the Supreme Court in Biswell disagreed.
The court of appeals32 equated the liquor statute in Colonnade with
the Gun Control Act in Biswell.33 Also, it recognized the similarity in
the coercion techniques, when compared with the Bumper guidelines.
It could see no exigent circumstances that might cause the case, fac-
tually, to fall within the Camara exception. 34 Yet, as noted, the Supreme
Court felt constrained to reverse without considering whether the fed-
eral agent, instead of demanding entry while flashing a statute before
Biswell's eyes, had told him that if he did not consent, a warrant could
be obtained or prosecution commenced, Biswell would not have al-
lowed the agent to enter his locked storeroom. 35 Consent becomes a
major issue and the Court's attempt to brush it aside (by stating that
in the field of regulatory inspections, which are limited by statute in
scope, time, and place, the legality of the search depends on the au-
thority of a valid statute and not consent) makes for bad law, for it
plainly puts "the horse before the cart." The holdings of Camara and
Bumper, when read in light of Colonnade, point to the importance of
"knowing" consent as it relates to a valid search where a warrant is ab-
sent and/or a statute is used as authority.
The Biswell Court, by having distinguished, rather than relying on,
these cases, arrived at what it felt was the desired result-to place the
public's need for warrantless regulatory inspections (regardless of the
or regulations issued pursuant thereto and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept
or stored by such dealer on such premises.
In Biswell and Colonnade, the Court noted that in neither statute had Congress formulated
procedures for the agents to follow when attempting to get on the premises or into
storage space thereon. Rather, a penalty was to be imposed on the proprietor for not
allowing entry, causing the holding in Colonnade that Congress selected a standard that
does not include forcible entry without a warrant. Why this inescapable conclusion was
never reached by the Court in Biswell must rest on its own mistaken assumption that
entry was not forcible. But see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
31. 397 U.S. at 74.
32. 442 F.2d at 1191.
33. See note 30 supra.
34. See note 21 supra.
35. The Court stated:
Respondent's submission to lawful authority and his decision to step aside and permit
the inspection rather than face a criminal prosecution is analogous to a householder's
acquiescence in a search pursuant to a warrant when the alternative is a possible
criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible entry.
406 U.S. at 315. This analogy, whatever its validity, is inapplicable to the facts as presented
in the Court's opinion. It must be assumed that Biswell was not made aware of the
holding in Colonnade and apparently stepped aside because of the mistaken belief that
he must, rather than, as the Court assumed, that he should.
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procedure followed) ahead of the individual citizen's right not to have
his privacy invaded. In doing so, it rejected judicial precedent for ju-
dicial expediency. Had the Court taken the cases cited and attempted
to arrive at a conclusion within their boundaries, then the decision of
the court of appeals would have been upheld.
Ronald Carl Weingrad
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY ABOLITION OF SOVEREIGN IM-
MUNITY-CITY NOT LIABLE FOR GOOD FAITH ENACTMENT OF ORDINANCE
LATER HELD TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL-The Court of Appeals of
Washington has held that liability for damages against a municipality
must be predicated upon the tortious conduct of the municipality, and
that the good faith enactment of an ordinance is a legislative act which
cannot be characterized as tortious, no matter how mistaken or unwise
the municipality's legislative action may have been.
J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d
600 (1972).
The appellant, the operator of a sauna massage parlor, commenced
an action to have declared unlawful a city ordinance' regulating the
operation of massage parlors to restrain the city from enforcing the
ordinance and to seek damages for interfering with the operation of
his business. The court held that the ordinance, which prohibited
massagists not licensed under one of the other healing arts2 from per-
forming massages upon the opposite sex, constituted an unreasonable
exercise of police power that went beyond the objective of protecting
the public from lewd acts in sauna massage parlors. 3 The court further
held that the ordinance was unduly oppressive to massagists and their
patients and constituted discrimination on the basis of sex in contra-
1. Lacey, Wash., Ordinance 139, April 23, 1970.
2. 18 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.01-.104.920 (1971) (relates to businesses or professions, but
massage or massotherapy is not specifically included in the healing arts covered in those
sections although it is utilized in varying degrees by several classifications which are
licensed).
3. J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (1972). The
acts complained of in this case were that sexually provocative advertising was carried in
the classified advertising columns of the Daily Olympian, that masseuses wore mini-skirts
and low cut blouses, and talked and acted in a sexually provocative manner. For a fee of
twenty dollars, undercover agents received what the police chief modestly referred to as
a "lower abdominal massage."
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